The “Hang’em High” other Conservatives on the Court Must be
Horrified
This Forum has been
unrelenting in its criticism of Justice Clarence Thomas, but apparently even
Justice Thomas does have it within him to ability to know that when the
Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to trial by jury, it
guarantees the right of the accused to trial by jury.
The situation in this
case
was very simple. An individual was accused and convicted of
using a gun in a criminal act. The
penalty is five years. If the gun were ‘brandished’ this is a different crime and the penalty is seven years. The jury
found the defendant guilty of using but not brandishing a gun and sentenced him to five years. The judge upped the sentence to seven years,
apparently deciding that the gun was brandished and effectively overruling the
jury. This of course gave the defendant
no chance to defend himself against the more severe charge and took the
decision out of the hands of the jury.
Justice Thomas said
no. In very simple plain English his
point was this.
As
noted, the essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact
is an element of the crime. When a finding of fact alters the legally
prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a
constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury. It is no
answer to say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with or
without that fact. It is obvious, for example, that a defendant could not be
convicted and sentenced for assault, if the jury only finds the facts for
larceny, even if the punishments prescribed for each crime are identical. One
reason is that each crime has different elements and a defendant can be
convicted only if the jury has found each element of the crime of conviction.
Similarly,
because the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable
sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that
must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have
received if a different range had been applicable. . . . The essential point is
that the aggravating fact produced a higher range, which, in turn, conclusively
indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. It
must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his dissent Judge
Alito decried the overturning of precedent
The Court overrules a well-entrenched precedent with barely a
mention of stare decisis. See ante, at 16, n. 6. Stare decisis is, of
course, not an “inexorable command” in the field of constitutional law. Payne
v. Tennessee , 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) . Nevertheless, the Court ought to be consistent in its
willingness to reconsider precedent. If Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545 (2002) , and McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986) , can be cast
aside simply because a majority of this Court now disagrees with them, that
same approach may properly be followed in future cases. See Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332–364 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
but it seems clear that all he is doing is setting the scene
to overturn Roe v. Wade when it comes before the Court again.
So Conservatives are once again thwarted in their efforts to remove basic Constitutional rights from the accused, simply because they, the Conservatives, believe that the police would not arrest someone who is not guilty. The great irony here of course is that one of the most conservative members of the Court betrayed his brethern, and that is just the chocolate icing on the devil's food cake.
So Conservatives are once again thwarted in their efforts to remove basic Constitutional rights from the accused, simply because they, the Conservatives, believe that the police would not arrest someone who is not guilty. The great irony here of course is that one of the most conservative members of the Court betrayed his brethern, and that is just the chocolate icing on the devil's food cake.
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